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McGinley: McGinley: Can You Keep a Secret

Can You Keep a Secret?
You May Discover the Answer is Yes Under

Missouri's Privilege for Trade Secrets
State ex rel. Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of Missouri v. Anderson'
The basic law of capitalism is you or 1, not both you and .2
I. INTRODUCTION

Competition is at the heart of capitalism and part of what makes America
great. There should be a reward for performing better than the next guy. To
this end, it is not uncommon for our constitutions and lawmakers to
"encourage" the innovative and risk takers of our society. For example, entire
bodies of common law, in addition to state and federal statutory schemes,
protect ideas, creations, works and the like through copyright protection,
issuance of trademarks and patents, and "trade secret" status? "Trade
secrets," by definition, constitute valuable information which allow one trade
member to obtain an advantage over his or her competitors.4 As such, the
one who acquires the secret wishes to shelter it. Under some circumstances,
however, compromising this proprietary information may be appropriate in the
interest of justice.

1. 897 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
2. Karl Liebknecht, speech (1907), reprinted in THE MERRiAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 50 (1992).
3. See generallyTitle 15 of the United States Code [Trademarks]; Title 17 of the
United States Code [Copyrights]; Title 35 of the United States Code [Patents]; Title
37 of the Code of Federal Regulations [Trademarks, Copyrights and Patents]; Chapter
417 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (1996) [Missouri's Uniform Trade Secret Act].
4* "Trade secret" is a term of art. Classification of information, formulas,
patterns, etc. as "trade secrets" gives rise to certain protections afforded by law.
Black's Law Dictionaryprovides a typical definition of "trade secret":
A "trade secret," as protected from misappropriation, may consist of any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one's business, and which gives persons an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it; or, it may be a
formula or a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or
preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of
customers.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1494 (6th ed. 1990).

Other definitions of "trade secret" exist. See infra note 83.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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This Note examines which factors give rise to classification of
information, patterns, formulas and the like as "trade secrets." Missouri's
legislature, in its Uniform Trade Secrets Act, has offered a noncomprehensive
definition of "trade secret."' While this and other proffered definitions
provide some guidance, attempting to define any term of art cannot be done
in absolute measures. As a result, courts are left with a great deal of
discretion to write their own definitions on a case-by-case basis. In so doing,
courts should closely scrutinize both the nature of the purported proprietary
information and the policy implications of revealing or protecting "trade
secrets," such as the thwarting of innovation, product and industry safety,
technological development, and general principles of capitalism.6
In State ex rel. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Missouri v. Anderson,

plaintiff, a competitor of defendant, claimed a need to discover certain of
defendant's "trade secrets" to prosecute its case.7 This claimed need raised
the questions of whether and to what extent information valuable to an
adversary not only in the courtroom, but also in the marketplace, should be
discoverable. The court found that the items at issue were "trade secrets," and
plaintiff's need for the secrets did not outweigh the potential harm to the
defendant in revealing them, and thus denied discovery. 8
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Two consolidated underlying actions comprised the instant case. The
first, St. John's Medical Center v. Blue Cross Hospital Services, Inc. of

Missouri,was filed October 4, 1974, seeking monetary damages and injunctive

5. See infra note 83. This Note examines the scope and discoverability of
common law "trade secrets." In addition to common law protections, "trade secrets"
are given rights under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which has been adopted in at
least 41 jurisdictions, including Missouri (see Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 417.450-417.467
(1994 & Supp. 1995)). For a discussion of the difference between common law
actions and actions under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, see Susan C. Miller,
Comment, Florida'sUniform Trade SecretsAct, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 863 (1988).

6. For a discussion of the origins of the concept of "trade secrets" and theories of
liability thereunder, see Edmond Gabbay, Note, All the King's Horses-Irreparable
Harm in Trade Secret Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 804 (1984); see also
Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Casefor a FederalTrade SecretsAct, 8 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 427 (1995). For a discussion of Fifth Amendment implications of "trade

secrets" (defining "trade secrets" as property entitled to Fifth Amendment protection),
see John C. Janka, Comment, FederalDisclosureStatutes and the Fifth Amendment:
The New Status of Trade Secrets, 54 U. CHm. L. REV. 334 (1987).

7. State ex rel. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Missouri v. Anderson, 897 S.W.2d
167, 170-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
8. Id. at 171.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/14
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relief.9 Several hospitals"° filed the second action on September 17, 1976,
against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Missouri ("Blue Cross"), Relator,"
seeking relief similar to that in the first action.'"
Blue Cross is a not-for-profit health care services corporation operating
pursuant to Chapter 354 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. 3 Blue Cross
contracted to4 furnish specified health care benefits to persons it referred to as
"members."' These contracts contained a provision prohibiting members
from assigning their health care benefits to health care providers. 5 Blue
health care providers, who provided services
Cross also contracted with certain
6
members.
Cross's
to Blue
St. John's Medical Center ("St. John's"), although a health care provider,
did not have a contract with Blue Cross.' 7 When St. John's furnished health
care services to a person who had a contract with Blue Cross, it did not
receive payment for those services directly from Blue Cross.' 8 Instead, Blue
Cross's practice was to pay its members, and the members could then pay St.
John's. 9
St. John's, in an attempt to avoid this two-step process, received
assignments of benefits from Blue Cross's members.2" Blue Cross refused
to honor those assignments.2 Thereafter, St. John's instituted the first
underlying lawsuit seeking damages for Blue Cross's failure to honor various
assignments by its members to St. John's and for an injunction requiring Blue
Cross to pay assigned benefits directly to it in the future.' On October 18,

9. Id. at 168.
10. The hospitals involved were West Plains Memorial Hospital, Cardwell
Memorial Hospital, Inc., St. Francis Hospital and Southeast Hospital, Dexter Memorial
Hospital, and Dunklin County Memorial Hospital. Anderson, 897 S.W.2d at 168.

11. A relator is a party in interest who is permitted to institute a proceeding in the
name of the State when the right to sue resides solely in that sovereign. BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY

1289 (6th ed. 1990).

12. Anderson, 897 S.W.2d at 168.
13. Id. Chapter 354 of the Missouri Revised Statutes governs the operation of
certain health services corporations, health maintenance organizations, and prepaid
dental plans. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 354.010-354.725 (1994 & Supp. 1995)
14.
15.
16.
services

Anderson, 897 S.W.2d at 168.
Id
Id The contracts with the health care providers cover various health care
with a specified amount payable to the provider directly from Blue Cross. Id

17. Id
18. Id
19. Id
20. Id
21. Id.
22. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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1974, the trial court issued a temporary injunction requiring Blue Cross to
include St. John's's name on checks issued to Blue Cross's members for
benefits provided by St. John's.'
On February 28, 1994, St. John's served a subpoena duces tecum 24 upon
an officer of Blue Cross seeking to have certain documents (listed below)
produced at a deposition.' After various filings, hearings, and motions, the
trial court entered a protective order which limited disclosure of said
documents to the counsel and specified officials of St. John's. 2 6 Before
producing these documents, Blue Cross filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the circuit court denied.2 ' Blue Cross then filed a Petition for Writ
of Prohibition. 2' The Southern District granted a preliminary order staying
production of the documents.29
Blue Cross's writ of prohibition sought to prevent the circuit court from
allowing St. John's access to several documents: (1) the current pricing
arrangements between Blue Cross and various hospitals in a thirteen-county
area in Southwest Missouri; (2) studies of the relative costs of health care at
hospitals in that area; and (3) a provision of a 1994 contract between Blue
Cross and Lester E. Cox Medical Center ("Cox Medical Center"). 0
Blue Cross contended that officials at St. John's having access to the
disclosed documents had formed a corporation to establish a competitive
network of health care providers in Southwest Missouri which would compete
with Blue Cross.3'
Therefore, Blue Cross contended the requested
documents contained confidential and proprietary business information, the
disclosure of which would cause Blue Cross irreparable harm. Thus, Blue
Cross argued that prohibition of production of the documents should lie.3
Cox Medical Center also protested disclosure of the information.33
Conversely, St. John's contended the documents were relevant to the

23. Id.
24. A subpoena duces tecum is a court process initiated by a party in litigation
compelling production of specific documents. BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1426 (6th
ed. 1990). See also Mo. SUP. CT. R. 58.01 (1996).
25. Anderson, 897 S.W.2d at 169.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.See infra Section III.C.2 for a discussion of writs of prohibition.
29. Anderson, 897 S.W.2d at 169.
30. Id
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Cox Medical Center, a third party to the lawsuit, was a hospital in competition
with St. John's. Id.at 171.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/14
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underlying action, and that a specific need existed for them. 4 Thus, St.
John's argued the documents should have been discoverable.
The Southern District ruled its preliminary order should be made
absolute, holding that prohibition of discovery of the documents should lie as
the documents were confidential ("trade secrets"), and the risk of irreparable
harm and the invasion of non-party privacy rights outweighed St. John's' need
for the requested documents.36

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Introduction
By definition, a lawsuit is an adversarial process. As a result, parties to
a suit will have competing interests. Recognizing this potential for conflict,
the rules of discovery strive for compromise in many situations. The
following two rules illustrate this attempt. Generally, a party to a lawsuit may
obtain discovery of any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter of the pending suit.37 However, as an exception to this general rule,
a court can issue a protective order precluding a party from obtaining
otherwise discoverable information." Such an order might be issued to
protect against the disclosure of a "trade secret" or other proprietary
information.39

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 170-71. See infra Section IV.B.

Anderson, 897 S.W.2d at 170-71.
Id. at 171.
MO. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(b)(1) (1996). Rule 56.01(b)(1) reads:
In General Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
38. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(c) (1996). Rule 56.01(c) reads:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought, and for good cause shown, the court may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden, or expense ....
39. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 56.01(c)(7) (1996). Rule 56.01(c)(7) reads:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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B. Scope of Discovery
As stated previously, Missouri Supreme Court Rule 56.01(b)(1) permits
discovery by a party to the lawsuit of any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the lawsuit.4" Thus, under the plain language of Rule 56.01, two
requirements exist for obtaining discovery: (1) the item sought to be
discovered must be relevant; and, (2) the item sought to be discovered must
not be privileged. While the balance of this Note focuses on the latter
requirement, a brief discussion of the former requirement may be beneficial.
Under Rule 56.01(b)(1), the term "relevant" is defined broadly to include
material "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."4 The Federal Rules of Evidence define "admissible evidence" as
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."42 However, as alluded to earlier and
as Rule 56.01 makes clear, not all relevant evidence is discoverable.

[T]hat a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a
designated way.
Protective orders might be issued and provide that:
(1) discovery not be had;
(2) that discovery be had only on specified terms and conditions, including
a designation of the time or place;
(3)that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than
that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the
discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed by be opened only by order of the
court; or
(7) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
40. See supra note 37 for the text of Mo. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(b)(1).
41. State ex rel. Stecher v. Dowd, 912 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Mo. 1995).
42. FED. R. Evlu. 401.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/14
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C. When Should Relevant Matters not be Discoverable?
1. Protective Orders
Upon motion of a party to the lawsuit or someone from whom discovery
is sought, a court may issue a protective order limiting or precluding discovery
of certain matters.43 As the language of Rule 56.01(c) and other discovery
rules suggest, a court has substantial discretion in the administration of
discovery rules.' If a party (or a non-party from whom discovery is sought)
feels that a discovery request should not be complied with, it can seek a
protective order under Rule 56.01(c)." A protective order might limit or
altogether prohibit discovery.46
The issuance of a protective order in discovery matters involves a fact
specific inquiry.47 In so doing, courts frequently will consider the conflicting
While the rules allow
interests of the interrogator and the respondent.4
49
do not contemplate
matter,
not
privileged,
they
discovery of any relevant
that all matters not privileged and relevant will be discoverable." As a
result, in ruling on objections to discovery requests, trial judges must consider
not only questions of privilege and relevance, but should also balance the need
of the interrogator to obtain the information against the respondent's burden
in furnishing it." Therefore, even if discoverable information is sought,
upon objection the court should consider whether the information can be
adequately furnished in a manner less intrusive, less burdensome, or less
expensive than that designated by the requesting party.52 While courts have
considerable discretion in issuing a protective order, that discretion is not

43. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 56.01(c). See supra note 38 for the text of Rule 56.01(c).
44. State ex rel. Plank v. Koehr, 831 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Mo. 1992). See supra
note 38 for the text of Rule 56.01(c).
45. Id. See supra note 38 for the text of Rule 56.01(c).
46. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(c)(7). See supra note 39. For a discussion of the
nature of protective orders in the context of trade secret cases, see Gabbay, supranote
6, at 815.
47. State exrel. Charterbank Springfield, N.A. v. Donegan, 658 S.W.2d 919,923
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
48. State ex rel. Hoffman v. Campbell, 428 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Mo. Ct. App.
1968).
49. MO. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(b).
50. See Mo. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(c); see supranote 38. See also State ex reL Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Missouri v. Anderson, 897 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995).
51. Boswell v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757, 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
52. See State ex rel. Albe t v. Adams, 540 S.W.2d 26, 30-31 (Mo. 1976).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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absolute, and an improper decision may be barred through the issuance of a
writ of prohibition. The writ, as discussed below, can enjoin a court from
acting in a certain fashion.
2. Writs of Prohibition
Writs of prohibition are closely associated with the issuance of protective
orders. When the trial court either grants or fails to grant a protective order,
an aggrieved person may seek to change this result by filing a writ of
prohibition against the court. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary
judicial remedy whereby a court or official about to commit an act judicial in
nature is ordered not to do so, on the ground that such court or official is
acting without or in excess of itsjurisdiction.53 Courts take the view that
writs are to be used with great caution and forbearance and only in cases of
extreme necessity.54 Prohibition should not be used as a substitute for
appeal, and it should not be used to adjudicate grievances that may be
adequately redressed in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.55
When seeking a writ of prohibition, the relator 56 petitions a superior
court to hear and decide whether the lower court or official has 'jurisdiction'
to pursue the lower court action." In response to the petition, the superior
court issues a preliminary writ of prohibition to the lower court or official to
show why the writ should not be made permanent.58 A party opposing the
writ will usually file a return to the preliminary order to show cause why it
should not lie, or he may simply move to dismiss or quash the preliminary
order.59 Issuance of the preliminary order is basically a formality as the

53. State ex rel. Douglas Toyota v. Keeter, 804 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Mo. 1991).
See also Note, The Writ of Prohibition in Missouri, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 511

[hereinafter Prohibitionin Missouri].
54. Keeter, 804 S.W.2d at 752. See also infra note 57.
55. Keeter, 804 S.W.2d at 752. See also infra note 57.
56. See supra note 11. A relator can be a party to the suit or a third party.
Prohibitionin Missouri,supranote 53, at 513.

57. See Prohibitionin Missouri,supranote 53, at 514. Typically, there are three
situations where superior courts have found that an inferior court has exceeded its
"jurisdiction" and thus have issued a writ prohibiting said action. The first is where
the inferior court lacks either personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Second, a writ
may issue where there exists a clear excess ofjurisdiction or abuse of discretion such
that the lower court lacks the power to act as contemplated. Third, a writ may issue,
even though there is no clear abuse of discretion or lack of personal or subject matter
jurisdiction, when there is no adequate remedy on appeal. State ex rel. Noranda
Aluminum, Inc. v. Rains, 706 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Mo. 1986).
58. See Prohibitionin Missouri,supra note 53, at 514.
59. See Prohibitionin Missouri,supra note 53, at 514.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/14
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superior court still must decide whether to make the order absolute, or,
alternatively, to quash the preliminary order.'
Examination of several prior cases may help explain the somewhat
equivocal standards laid out above. State ex rel. CharterbankSpringfield,
N.A. v. Donegan6 involved a dispute over claimed deficiencies under a
promissory note. The plaintiff sought to depose defendant, who lived in the
State of California, at plaintiff's attorney's office in Springfield, Missouri. 2
Defendant claimed through his attorney that he was physically and financially
unable to travel to Missouri." Defendant sought a protective order to strike
the deposition notice or have plaintiff pay defendant's travel and lodging
expenses in attending the deposition.' The trial court granted an order
forbidding plaintiff from compelling defendant to appear in Missouri for the
deposition unless plaintiff paid defendant's expenses." Plaintiff petitioned
for a writ of prohibition, which the Southern District granted, holding that the
trial court abused its discretion in entering defendant's protective order.'
The Southern District stated the proper order would have been, if defendant
was going to be in Missouri for the trial, then he must, at no expense to
plaintiff, arrive a sufficient time in advance of the trial date to allow for the
taking of his deposition by plaintiff.67
State ex rel. Albert v. Adams" presents another prohibition case in the
context of discovery. In Adams, plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent
defendant from trespassing across their land.69 Defendant admitted to use of
a portion of plaintiffs' land but claimed such use was based on a deed for a
"private roadway" she was granted from plaintiffs' predecessor in title.7"
Both parties admitted the existence of the easement for the private roadway
but differed as to the scope of the easement.7' During the injunction
proceeding, plaintiffs served interrogatories on defendant, asking for a legal
72
description by metes and bounds of the claimed "private roadway.
Defendant's answer to the interrogatory stated she was unable to do so as she

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See Prohibitionin Missouri,supra note 53, at 516.
658 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
Id. at 920.
Id. at 920-21.
Id.
at 921.
Id at 922.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 923.
540 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1976).
Id at 28.
Id
Id at 29.
Id

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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had no survey available and was not trained to survey the property herself.73
Plaintiffs responded by moving for summary judgment, claiming defendant's
answers were evasive and thus should have been treated as a failure to
answer.74 The trial judge granted the motion and defendant petitioned for a
writ of prohibition."
The Missouri Supreme Court made absolute its preliminary writ of
prohibition barring the entry of summary judgment.76 The court found the
sole objective of the interrogatories was to force defendant to have the
roadway surveyed so that the result of said survey would be available to
plaintiffs." The court stated that not only had plaintiffs failed to show they
had a substantial need for the survey, but more importantly, plaintiffs failed
to show they were unable to obtain the same themselves.78 Thus, forcing
defendant to obtain the survey would expose her to unwarranted annoyance,
expense, and oppression.79
As the cases discussed above illustrate, in the context of discovery
matters, justification for issuing a writ of prohibition exists when the trial
court has abused its discretion and/or there is no adequate remedy on
appeal.80 Consider the following as a further example of this. If an item
sought to be discovered is in fact a trade secret or other confidential
information, and a party does discover the item, it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to retroactively correct the error on appeal, as the mere revelation
of a trade secret destroys its protected status. 8' As discussed below, in the
case of trade secrets, the inherent conflict between relevance and
confidentiality presents competing issues of privilege and trial preparation, and
also pits the courtroom against the marketplace.

73. Id
74. Id. at 28-29.
75. Id at 29.

76. Id. at 31.
77. Id. at 29-30.
78. Id. at 30.

79. Id.
80. See Prohibitionin Missouri,supranote 53, at 524. See also State ex rel. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Missouri v. Anderson, 897 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Mo. Ct. App.

1995).
81. See generallyAnderson, 897 S.W.2d at 169-71. See also infra note 105.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/14
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D. "Trade Secrets"
1. Privileged or Discoverable?
Rule 56.01(c)(7) provides in part that a court, for good cause shown, may
make an order preventing or limiting the revelation of a "trade secret" or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information.82 Courts
have generally examined the following factors to determine whether
information is in fact a "trade secret": (1) the extent to which the information
sought is known outside of the business; (2) the extent to which the
information sought is known to those involved in the business; (3) the extent
of the measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information sought; and (4)
the value of the information sought to the business and its competitors.

82. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 56.01(c)(7).

83. Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp, 117 F.R.D. 506, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).

The

Anderson court noted that this is the standard federal courts have adopted when
applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Moreover, Missouri Supreme Court

Rule 56.01(c)(7) is identical to Rule 26(c), and apparently was derived from it.
Therefore, federal law is strong, persuasive authority in interpreting the meaning of the
Missouri rule. Anderson, 897 S.W.2d at 169-70. Other factors courts have considered
in determining whether information is in fact a "trade secret" include: the amount of
effort or money expended by the business owner in developing the information, and
the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others. Ultra-Life Labs., Inc. v. Eames, 221 S.W.2d 224, 232 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1949).
In addition to the factors courts look at in determining whether information is a
trade secret, it may be helpful to offer an actual definition for "trade secrets."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) defines a "trade secret" as:
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or do not use it. It may be a formula
for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or
preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of
customers. It differs from other secret information in a business in that it
is not simply information as to single or ephermal events in the conduct of
the business, as, for example, the amount or other terms of a secret bid for
a contract or the salary of certain employees, or the security investments
made or contemplated, or the date fixed for the announcement of a new
policy or for bringing out a new model or the like. A trade secret is a
process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business.
Generally, it relates to the production of goods, as, for example, a machine
or formula for the production of an article. It may, however, relate to the
sale of goods or to other operations in the business, such as a code for
determining discounts, rebates or other concessions in a price list or
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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A finding that information is a "trade secret" does not end the inquiry.
There is no per se rule that "trade secrets" are not discoverable." In order
to avoid or limit discovery of a trade secret, the party seeking protection must
establish that the information sought is indeed a "trade secret" and then
demonstrate that its disclosure might be harmful.85 Once the party seeking
protection meets these requirements, the burden shifts to the other party to

catalogue, or a list of specialized customers, or a method of bookkeeping
or other office management.
See United States v. International Business Machines, 67 F.R.D. 40, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 18-19 (Mo. 1966) (en
banc).
Additionally, even if the subject matter meets the definition of a "trade secret,"
before receiving "trade secret" status, the subject matter must have been treated as such
by its proprietor. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) offers the following insights

into the secrecy of a "trade secret":
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. Matters of public
knowledge or of a general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated
by one as his secret. Matters which are completely disclosed by the goods
which one markets cannot be his secret. Substantially, a trade secret is
known only in the particular business in which it is used. It is not requisite
that only the proprietor of the business know it. He may, without losing his
protection, communicate it to employees involved in its use. He may
likewise communicate it to others pledged to secrecy. Nevertheless, a
substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of
improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the information ....
The Missouri General Assembly also has defined "trade secrets," at least for the
purpose of Missouri's Uniform Trade Secret Act, incorporating both the subject matter
and secrecy requirements. A "trade secret" is defined therein as:
information, including but not limited to, technical or nontechnical data, a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process, that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure
or use; and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 417.453(4) (Supp. 1995).
For a discussion of the difference between the Restatement definition of "trade
secret" and the Uniform Trade Secret Act's definition of "trade secret," see Miller,
supra note 5, at 870-76; see also Gale R. Peterson, Symposium, Trade Secrets In An
Information Age, 32 HOUS. L. REv. 385 (1995).

84. Cutler v. Lewiston Daily Sun, 105 F.R.D. 137, 140 (D. Me. 1985).
85. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/14

12

1997]

McGinley: McGinley: Can You Keep a Secret
19MSSOURI'S TRADE SECRET PRIVILEGE

establish that discovery of the secret is relevant and necessary to the action.86
If the party seeking discovery fails to establish the relevancy of or its need for
the information sought, then discovery should be denied." However, if the
party seeking discovery meets its burden, it is then within the discretion of the
trial court to decide whether the need for the information sought outweighs the
harm of disclosure.88
Hartley Pen Company v. United States District Courtfor the Southern
District of California, Central Division89 provides a classic example of a
"trade secret" case. In Hartley, plaintiff (Hartley) manufactured ball point
pens containing cartridges of ink made under a "secret" formula belonging to
a third party to the suit (Formulabs). In manufacturing the ink used in its
pens, plaintiff also used dye made by the defendant (du Pont).91 Plaintiff
alleged that defendant supplied defective and unmerchantable dye lots and
suffered damages as a result thereof.' Defendant, purportedly in aid of one
of its defenses, served interrogatories upon plaintiff to learn Formulabs'
"secret" ink formula as well as certain of Formulabs' "secret" testing
procedures.93 Although plaintiff objected to said discovery, the district court
ordered plaintiff to answer the interrogatories.94 Plaintiff petitioned for writ
of prohibition to preclude the order requiring disclosure of the "secret" ink
formula and testing procedures.9'
The Ninth Circuit held that the ink formula and testing processes were
"trade secrets" and that their revelation would cause irreparable harm.
Therefore, plaintiff was entitled to some form of relief.96 However, the court
remanded to allow defendant to establish that the information it sought was
relevant and necessary to the prosecution of its defense.97 On remand, the
district court found discovery of the secret ink and testing procedures was both
relevant and necessary to the defense and thus allowed discovery."
However, the district court allowed only limited discovery. Namely, the
"trade secrets" could be examined by no more than five agents of defendant

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961).

90. Id. at 325.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 325-26.
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id at 330.
Id. at 331-32.
Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485, 494 (9th Cir. 1963).
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who were permanently enjoined from revealing any part of the secrets, or any
facts likely to lead to their revelation, except as may reasonably have been
needed during the trial."
Hartley involved a "secret" ink formula produced by research and
development and capital investment by a company. "Trade secrets" do not
always involve matters that are this unique or seemingly proprietary. When
these types of "secrets" are at issue, the party seeking protection may have a
more difficult time satisfying its burden showing that the information is in fact
a trade secret and its revelation would be harmful. For example, in Cuno, Inc.
v. Pall Corporation,'0 the defendant wanted to protect certain documents
plaintiff sought to discover. Defendant claimed the documents were internal
proprietary documents containing valuable confidential information generated
by its scientists."° ' The court found that defendant did not show good cause
that the documents should be protected. The court indicated that conclusory
statements that documents were maintained as internal proprietary documents
and contained valuable confidential technical information were not sufficient
to show good cause."° Additionally, the court found defendant had failed
to specifically identify a clearly defined harm associated with disclosure of the
documents.0 3 While the court found the documents were not confidential,
it still provided that plaintiff should not use the information it sought outside
of the litigation at issue."°4
2. Secrecy: Once a "Trade Secret,"
Always a "Trade Secret?"
Even if the subject matter of a purported trade secret meets the definition
of a "trade secret," if it is not guarded in some manner by its proprietor, it will
not receive the protection afforded "trade secrets."'0 5 Failure to guard the

99. Id
100. 117 F.R.D. 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
at 507.
101. Id.
at 508.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939); National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman,
409 S.W.2d 1, 22 (Mo. 1966) (en bane). See also supra note 83. See generally
Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Disclosure of Trade Secret as Abandonment of
Secrecy, 92 A.L.R.3d 138 (1979) (disclosure of secret information results in
abandonment of "trade secret" status).
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information may be a result of an omission by the proprietor," 6 or it may
be that the information is of a type that simply cannot be guarded. 7
Although disclosure of a "trade secret" by its proprietor effectively
destroys its- status as such, certain instances exist where the secret will remain
protected notwithstanding limited disclosure. For example, a proprietor may
freely communicate the secret to employees involved in its use.'08
Additionally, disclosure to one in a confidential relationship with the
proprietor will not destroy the protection afforded the secret.0 9

106. NationalRejectors,409 S.W.2d at 22, provides an example. In that case the
plaintiff, National Rejectors ("National"), claimed that the design drawings of certain
products (slug rejectors and electrical coin changers) it designed and manufactures
were proprietary -because the dimensioning shown on said design drawings, along with
substantial research and development toward refining said products, allowed National
to manufacture the products with a greater degree of accuracy, with a lesser degree of
tolerance and with a greater efficiency than similar devices manufactured by National's
competitors. Id at 17. The court found that National failed to take any steps at its
plant to keep design drawings secret and confidential. Id. at 22. National's engineers
and other personnel were not called upon to sign agreements not to compete with
National, nor were National's employees told that anything about National's products
were regarded as secret or confidential. Id. Therefore, the design drawings were not
afforded "trade secret" status. Id. at 23-24.
107. If this is the case, then the information or product likely was never even a
proper subject matter to be considered a "trade secret" in the first instance. In
NationalRejectors, 409 S.W.2d at 20, there was testimony that the products at issue
were of a type that could be easily taken apart and studied, and that if this were done,
then the information National regarded as confidential (the dimensioning of the
product) could be readily obtained. The court suggested that this evidence could
establish that the drawings were not in fact trade secrets. Id.
108. NationalRejectors, 409 S.W.2d at 19. See also supranote 83.
109. Reddi-Wip, Inc. v. Lemay Valve Co., Inc., 354 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1962). In Reddi-Wip, the court found the confidential relationship arose from an
employment contract signed by the employer and employee requiring the employee to
assign the rights to an invention to the employer. Thus, the employee could not then
reveal the information without liability to the employer. Id. at 916. In such a case,
liability may exist against the one who has revealed the trade secret if it can be shown
that: (1) a "trade secret" existed, (2) the "trade secret" was communicated to another,
(3) the communication occurred while the communicator was in a position of trust and
confidence, and (4) the proprietor of the "trade secret" was injured thereby. Id. at 917.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In State ex rel. Blue Cross andBlue Shield ofMissouri v. Anderson, three
different documents were sought to be discovered: (1) the current pricing
arrangements between Blue Cross and various hospitals in a thirteen-county
area in Southwest Missouri; (2) studies of the relative costs of health care at
hospitals in that area; and (3) a provision of a 1994 contract between Blue
Cross and Cox Medical Center."' In considering Blue Cross's Petition for
Writ of Prohibition, the court followed the analytical framework laid out in
the previous section. First, it determined whether the information sought to
be discovered constituted "trade secrets.""'
Next, after finding the
information was "trade secrets," it then considered whether it was relevant, and
whether St. John's had a specific need for it."'
Finally, the court
considered other factors, including the privacy rights of non-parties, which it
utilized in balancing the need for discovering the items against the harm in the
doing the same.'
A. Was the Information Sought "Trade Secrets?"
Blue Cross argued that the information sought to be discovered was
confidential and "trade secrets." It argued that the pricing arrangements were
not available publicly, that they contained information agreed to through
private negotiations, that the hospitals that were parties to the agreements did
not want the information revealed, and that the pricing arrangements were
available to Blue Cross's employees only on a limited basis."'
Similarly, Blue Cross argued the study of relative health costs was
confidential."'
The study was an analysis of the confidential pricing
information compiled by employees of Blue Cross." 6 Blue Cross argued
that only a few of its key employees had access to the study, the study was
kept in a locked file, and revelation of the information in the study would
allow St. John's to entice health care providers to leave Blue Cross and join
St. John's' network of health care providers."'

110. State ex rel. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Missouri v. Anderson, 897
S.W.2d 167, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
111. Id.at 170.
112. Id at 170-71.
113. Id.at 171.
114. Id at 170.
115. Id.
116. Id
117. Id
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The court found that all of the information at issue was confidential and
"trade secrets," and that specific potential harm could result from its
disclosure."' The court presumed disclosure to a competitor was more
harmful than disclosure to a non-competitor." 9
Upon finding the
information was in fact confidential, the burden then shifted to St. John's to
show relevance and specific need. 2 '
B. Did St. John's Show Relevance and Specific Need?
St. John's argued that each of the documents it sought to discover was
both relevant and necessary, in that the documents would have supported a
response to Blue Cross's defense in the underlying action. 2 ' As a defense,
Blue Cross argued that non-assignment clauses, like the ones contained in its
contract with its members, helped to contain health care costs in Southwest
Missouri." 2 St. John's argued that the contract with Cox Medical Center
was relevant to Blue Cross's defense because, if Blue Cross and Cox Medical
Center were parties to an exclusive contract, then Blue Cross could not
contract with -St. John's or other local hospitals in an effort to contain health
care costs.'2' However, the court rejected this argument, finding that St.
John's already had other evidence that Blue Cross did in fact have an
exclusive agreement with a hospital in Southwest Missouri,'24 and thus, the
contract it sought to discover was not relevant.' 25
St. John's argued that the pricing arrangements and market study were
relevant to the issue of whether health care costs would actually be reduced
if Blue Cross were allowed to dishonor valid assignments. 2 6 The court
rejected this argument, finding that the pricing arrangements only showed
what the health care costs currently are at hospitals with contracts with Blue
"'
Cross. 27
Similarly, the market study only analyzed Blue Cross's business

118. Id
119. Id
120. Id
121. Id
122. Id
123. Id. at 170-71.
124. St. John's had the testimony of the regional vice president of Blue Cross at
a deposition acknowledging that Blue Cross had an exclusive agreement with a hospital
in the Southwest Missouri Area. Further, whether Cox Medical Center was that
hospital was not relevant. Id. at 171.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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approach to the health care industry, based on the cost at its member
hospitals.'28 Furthermore, neither document contained information regarding
health care charges by every health care provider in Southwest Missouri.
Rather, they were limited to hospitals which contracted with Blue Cross and
therefore the court found neither document relevant on the issue of whether
health care costs in Southwest Missouri were contained by non-assignment
clauses.'29 In summary, the court found St. John's had not established that
any of the requested documents were relevant, nor had it shown they were
necessary to its trial preparation.'
C. Privacy Rights of Non-Partiesand Other Factors
Cox Medical Center, a third party to the suit, also protested the discovery
of the information by St. John's.'
The court found discovery of the
information sought would impose a burden because doing so might affect the
privacy rights of non-parties. The pricing arrangements sought by St. John's
contained health care costs agreed to by non-party health care providers as a
The court noted that, as St. John's appeared
result of private negotiations.'
to provide health care services in the same geographical area as Cox Medical
Center and perhaps other hospitals included in the pricing arrangements, St.
John's appeared to be in competition with those other hospitals.'
an interest in keeping the cost arrangements
Consequently, those hospitals had
34
out of the hands of St. John's.
In summary, the Southern District made absolute its preliminary order
prohibiting discovery of each of the documents, holding that the documents
were confidential and "trade secrets," that a risk of irreparable harm would
exist if they were disclosed, and that St. John's did not establish the relevancy
of the documents or that they fulfilled a specific need for its trial
preparation.'35

128. Id.
129. Id.

130. Id.
131. Id. at 169.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id at 171.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 170-71.
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V. COMMENT

Three important questions are raised by an analysis of the Anderson
court's decision--() whether the information at issue should have been given
protected "trade secret" status, (2) whether the court's decision is supported
by policy considerations inherent in protecting "trade secrets," and (3) whether
the court could have better accommodated the interests of the parties.
A. Should the Information at Issue be
Classified as "Trade Secrets?"
The Anderson court determined that the pricing arrangements, the health
care cost studies, and the provision of the contract between Blue Cross and
Cox Medical Center were "trade secrets" and gave them absolute
protection." 6 In finding the information to be "trade secrets," the court
purported to follow the widely accepted "federal test" for determining whether
information is a "trade secret."' 37 While the court recited how the
information at issue met the "federal test,"'3 it nevertheless may have failed
to fully take into account the nature of the information which it was
considering.
Some information may be readily shown to meet the "trade secret"
definition. 3 9 For example, in Hartley, the Ninth Circuit found that a
manufacturer's ink formula and testing process were secrets. 40 This author
would argue that this sort of "trade secret," namely one that is at the heart of
a business's product, is of a different class than the information at issue in
Anderson. In Anderson, the court was confronted with pricing information,
health care cost studies, and a contract provision. While this information is
certainly capable of being just as proprietary as a design or formula, a court
should not be so quick to assume the same.' 4 '
The Anderson court, in finding the documents to be confidential, stated
that the pricing information was agreed to through private negotiations, was
not available publicly, and that various hospitals had indicated to Blue Cross

136. Id. at 170.
137. Id. See supra Section III.D for the "federal test."
138. Anderson, 897 S.W.2d at 170.

139. See supranote 83 for other definitions of a "trade secret." See supra Section

III.D for the "federal test."
140. Hartley Pen Co. v. United States District Court for the Southern District of
California, Central Division, 287 F.2d 324, 327 (9th Cir. 1961); see supra Section

III.D.
141. See infra note 162.
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that they did not want the information revealed.'42 While these factors
likely fall within the criteria established by the "federal test," given the wide
latitude of the "federal test," this should not always be conclusive as to
whether it truly makes the information "trade secrets." As the Restatement of
Torts, Section 757 suggests, for information to truly be regarded as a "trade
secret," that information must not only be confidential in nature but must
allow one to obtain an advantage over his competitors.'43
Prior cases have held that information which is guarded and treated as
proprietary by a business nonetheless does not deserve protection as a "trade
secret.'"" For example, in Reliance Insurance Company v. Barron's,45
the "trade secret" status of cash flow forecasts and cash budget and projections
was at issue. The Barron'scourt stated that internal management projections,
even if they are treated as confidential, and are allowed only limited access by
a company's employees, are not typically "trade secrets" as contemplated by
the rules of discovery.' 46
Similarly, in Paxton Company v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Company,47 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri
considered the confidentiality of a net interest rate that an insurance company
used in crediting the accounts of its policyholders.'48 That court found that
an affidavit by an employee of the insurance company stating that the
information was secret and confidential was insufficient to give "trade secret"
protection to the information.'49 Further, the Restatement definition itself
suggests50 that, generally, a "trade secret" relates to the production of
goods.'
These decisions do not compel the conclusion that the Anderson court
was incorrect in classifying the information at issue as "trade secrets." They
do, however, suggest that the record in cases dealing with information that is
not at the heart of a business's function should be scrutinized more closely.
Conclusory statements that information is confidential should not be sufficient,
as confidentiality is not the only requirement.'
If courts do not closely
examine allegations of this sort, the lenient "federal test" will almost certainly

142. Anderson, 897 S.W.2d at 170.
143. See supra note 83.
144. See infra note 162.
145. 428 F. Supp. 200, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
146. Id.
147. Frank Paxton Co. v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 86-0978-CV-W1, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10111, (W.D. Mo. Sept. 8, 1988).
148. Id. at *1.
149. Id.
150. See supra note 83.
151. Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 117 F.R.D. 506, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
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be satisfied by even the most insignificant internal business documents.
Ultimately, this might result in determinations being made by factfinders based
on records containing something less than all the relevant evidence.
B. Policy Considerations
Several rationales exist for protecting "trade secrets."' 52 Such reasons
include preventing the thwarting of innovation and the hampering of healthy
competition. 53 It is also argued that not providing protection would destroy
the incentive to improve product design and safety by discouraging the
development of new products.'54 Additionally, it has been argued that
absolute protection should be given to "trade secrets" because any revelation
of such information destroys its status as a "trade secret."' 55 Countervailing
policy considerations include providing a party with sufficient information to
adequately prepare its case for trial.'56
The Anderson court found that the potential harm to Blue Cross in
revealing the documents was greater than St. John's's need for the
documents.' 57 Apparently, this was an easy finding, as the court stated that
St. John's had failed to show that the information sought was relevant or that
it fulfilled a specific need for trial preparation.' 58 In making its decision,
the court presumed that revelation of information to a competitor is more
harmful than revelation to a non-competitor. 59 Although protection from
competitors is a valid rationale for providing "trade secret" status, a potential
problem exists with presuming inherent harm in revealing information to

152. See supra note 6.
153. In re Remington Arms Co., Inc., 952 F.2d 1029, 1031 (8th Cir. 1991). See
also infra note 162.
154. Remington, 952 F.2d at 1031-32.
155. Id. See supranote 83 for the definition of a "trade secret." See also supra
note 105.
156. State ex rel. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Missouri v. Anderson, 897
S.W.2d 167, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
157. Id. at 170-71.
158. Id. at 171. Although elementary, it should be noted that there is more than
one way to prove a case. For example, in Vaughn v. Michelin Tire Corporation,756
S.W.2d 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), a products liability action, defendant Michelin
alleged that certain documents showing the design specifications of one of defendant's
tires were trade secrets. While the court found that the documents were in fact "trade
secrets" and disallowed discovery of the same, plaintiffs still were able to admit into
evidence an exhibit constructed by plaintiff's expert depicting his rendition of the
design of the tire (produced by the expert by examining a cross section of the tire).
Id. at 556.
159. Anderson, 897 S.W.2d at 170.
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competitors."6 Potentially, the court forsakes inquiry into whether the
information is truly confidential and worthy of protection. In other words,
just because two businesses are in competition with each other, not all
information they have relating to their businesses should be confidential. 6'
The presumption certainly stacks the odds in favor of such a finding. The
policy behind the protection of trade secrets is to protect information that
gives one an advantage over his counterpart. Such protection should not be
allowed to shield information that should actually be discoverable merely
because the parties to the lawsuit are competitors in the same business arena.
C. Reaching Compromise Between the Parties
Many courts, when faced with a request to provide "trade secret"
protection to documents, will issue a limited protective order.'62 Under such
an order, discovery of the information is allowed, but is limited in its scope
or by certain conditions. For example, the court's order might provide for any
or all of the following: (1) that use of the information be limited to the
particular lawsuit, or (2) that the persons who are given access to the
information shall be limited, or (3) that reproduction of confidential
documents be limited or prohibited, or (4) that a bond be furnished to protect
against the risk of injury, or (5) that an 63attorney be designated to serve as
custodian for all confidential documents.
Allowing limited discovery with the court determining the condition of
said discovery seeks to serve the competing interests of the parties. It is not
always fully effective, as some "trade secrets" undoubtedly will lose their
value upon the slightest revelation." However, a court should remain open
to this alternative as a means of protecting the confidentiality of proprietary
information while ensuring the pursuit of fairly litigated trials. In Anderson,

160. See id at 170.
161. At least one Missouri appellate court has found that information similar to
that at issue in Anderson--contract prices, escalator factors and base-line prices of
company contracts-are not proprietary. See State ex rel Utility Consumers Council
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
162. See In re Remington Arms Co., Inc., 952 F.2d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 1991).
163. ld
164. In the context of an adjudication, the revelation of "trade secrets" under an
order protecting dissemination does not serve to destroy the classification of the
information as a "trade secret" to the public at large. Sedlock by Sedlock v. BIC
Corp., 926 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1991). For a discussion of the limits on the
dissemination of discovered information, see Patrick M. Livingston, Note, Seattle
Times v. Rhinehart. Making Good Cause a Good Standard for Limits on
Disseminationof DiscoveredInformation,47 U. PrrT. L. REv. 547 (1986).
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the court could have pursued this alternative to better accommodate both
65
parties' interests.
VI. CONCLUSION

Protection of "trade secrets" presents obvious problems in our adversarial
system. On the one hand, if information is in fact a "trade secret," revelation
of the same likely will destroy its value. However, of equal but competing
importance is the court's role in ensuring the furtherance of justice. In short,
when a court seeks to determine whether information is entitled to "trade
secret" protection, it is faced with the difficult task of not only determining the
nature of the information at issue, but also determining the motives of the
parties in seeking to protect or reveal that information. The Anderson court
gave strict protection to the information at issue. While this was not
necessarily a bad result, in the interest of fairness and justice the court should
have given more attention to the nature of the information at issue.
Additionally, the court might have considered pursuing alternative means, such
as limited disclosure, thus accommodating both allowing discovery and
affording a degree of protection to the information.
BRIAN R. MCGiNLEY

165. The trial court originally did provide for limited discovery of the documents.
Anderson, 897 S.W.2d at 169.
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